Na koje bitke u Drugom svjetskom ratu je pucanje Enigme presudno uticalo?

Na koje bitke u Drugom svjetskom ratu je pucanje Enigme presudno uticalo?

Tek što sam gledao Igra imitacije, Znatiželjan sam o utjecaju pucanja Enigme na ishod Drugoga svjetskog rata.

Na koje bitke su utjecale informacije dekodirane Enigmom? Koje bitke bi vjerovatno bile izgubljene bez loma koda?


Prema "Marčerskim naredbama", Enigma je imala odlučujući utjecaj na (drugu) bitku kod El Alameina. Montgomeryjevi prvi napadi su uzvraćeni velikim gubitkom. Pod drugačijim okolnostima, on (ili drugi zapovjednik) je mogao prekinuti napad (kao što je general US Grant učinio u Cold Harboru, u Građanskom ratu).

No, Enigma je upozorila Montgomeryja na činjenicu da su Rommelovi gubici bili podjednako veliki u apsolutnom smislu, a dvostruko teži u proporcionalnom smislu (Montgomery je nadmašio Rommela barem dva prema jedan), te da je Rommel bio u "zaista užasnom stanju". Tako je Montgomery nastavio napad i iscrpljenjem uništio Rommelovu vojsku.

Enigma je igrala ulogu u kasnijim kampanjama, u Italiji, Normandiji itd., Ali nikada tako odlučno kao u El Alameinu.


Najočiglednija pojedinačna bitka koja je bila uticao by ENIGMA može, ironično, biti (rane faze) Bitka kod Bulgea. Hitlerova paranoja je konačno napredovala do takvog stanja 1944. godine bio je uvjeren da saveznici prisluškuju njegove obavještajne podatke; pa je inzistirao da svi planovi sastavljeni za taj napad NE koriste napuknutu šifru. Verovatno je da su se saveznici navikli da to nikada i ne budu grubo iznenađen, što je dovelo do određenog stepena povjerenja koje je koštalo živote u decembru 1944.

Imajte na umu da, iako je Hitlerov zaključak bio točan, ovo je ipak samo Hitlerova paranoja. Upotreba ENIGMA obavještajnih podataka od strane saveznika bila je toliko štedljiva da nije imao logičku osnovu za ovaj zaključak. Osim u sjevernom Atlantiku, gdje je bitka za Britance bila zaista egzistencijalna, držana je kao rezerva za sprečavanje upravo takvog scenarija koji se dogodio 16. decembra 1944 - masovnog njemačkog iznenadnog napada u slabo odbranjenom sektoru.

U korist saveznika, ključna bitka/kampanja bila bi ona konvoja trgovačkih marinaca u sjevernom Atlantiku kroz mračne dane 1941. i 1942. Britanci nikada nisu shvatili da su Nijemci sredinom 1930 -ih prekršili šifre trgovačkih marinaca, pa je samo uz pomoć obavještajnih podataka ENIGMA -e prošlo je dovoljno konvoja da zadrže Britaniju na površini Kao što je bilo.


Kriptoanaliza enigme

Kriptoanaliza enigme Sistem šifriranja omogućio je zapadnim saveznicima u Drugom svjetskom ratu da čitaju značajne količine Morseovih kodiranih radio komunikacija sila Osovine koje su šifrirane pomoću mašina Enigma. To je dovelo do vojne inteligencije koja je, zajedno s onom iz drugih dešifriranih prijenosa radijskih i teleprintera Axis, dobila kodno ime Ultra. Vrhovni saveznički zapovjednik Zapada Dwight D. Eisenhower to je smatrao "odlučujućim" za pobjedu saveznika. [1]

Mašine Enigma bile su porodica prenosivih mašina za šifriranje sa kodiračima rotora. [2] Dobre radne procedure, pravilno sprovedene, učinile bi mašinu Enigma sa utičnicom neraskidivom. [3] [4] [5] Međutim, većina njemačkih vojnih snaga, tajnih službi i civilnih agencija koje su koristile Enigmu koristile su loše operativne procedure, a upravo su te loše procedure omogućile da se strojevi Enigme preusmjere i šifre za čitanje.

Nemački Enigma opremljen utičnicom postao je glavni kripto sistem nacističke Nemačke. Razbio ga je Biro za šifriranje poljskog Glavnog štaba u decembru 1932. godine, uz pomoć obavještajnog materijala koji je dostavio Francuska, nabavljen od njemačkog špijuna. Mjesec dana prije izbijanja Drugog svjetskog rata, na konferenciji održanoj u blizini Varšave, poljski Biro za šifriranje podijelio je svoje tehnike i tehnologiju razbijanja enigme sa Francuzima i Britancima. Tokom njemačke invazije na Poljsku, osnovno osoblje poljskog Biroa za šifriranje evakuirano je preko Rumunjske u Francusku, gdje su osnovali obavještajnu stanicu za signale PC Bruno uz podršku francuskih objekata. Uspješna saradnja Poljaka, Francuza i Britanaca u Bletchley Parku nastavila se do juna 1940. godine, kada se Francuska predala Nijemcima.

Od ovog početka, Britanska vlada Code and Cypher School (GC & ampCS) u Bletchley Parku izgradila je opsežne kriptoanalitičke sposobnosti. U početku je dešifriranje uglavnom bilo od Luftwaffe (Njemačko vazduhoplovstvo) i nekoliko njih Heer (Poruke njemačke vojske), kao Kriegsmarine (Njemačka mornarica) koristile su mnogo sigurnije procedure za upotrebu Enigme. Alan Turing, matematičar i logičar sa Sveučilišta Cambridge, pružio je velik dio izvornog razmišljanja koje je dovelo do dizajna kriptoanalitičkih mašina bombi koje su bile ključne u konačnom razbijanju pomorske Enigme. Međutim, Kriegsmarine predstavila je verziju Enigme sa četvrtim rotorom za svoje podmornice, što je rezultiralo produženim razdobljem kada se te poruke nisu mogle dešifrirati. Uzimanjem odgovarajućih ključeva za šifriranje i upotrebom mnogo bržih bombi američke mornarice, nastavljeno je redovno, brzo čitanje poruka podmornica.


Bletchley 's bombe

Turing mašina sa rupama protiv mašine. Prototipni model njegove anti-Enigme & quotbombe & quot, nazvan jednostavno Victory, instaliran je u proljeće 1940. godine.

Njegove bombe pretvorile su Bletchley Park u tvornicu za razbijanje šifri. Još 1943. godine Turingove mašine su lomile nevjerovatnih ukupno 84.000 poruka Enigme svakog mjeseca - dvije poruke svake minute.

Turing je lično razbio oblik Enigme koji su koristili podmornici koji su grabili sjevernoatlantske trgovačke konvoje.

To je bio presudan doprinos. Konvoji su krenuli iz Sjeverne Amerike natovareni ogromnim teretom osnovnih potrepština za Britaniju, ali podmornice i#x27 torpeda potopili su toliko brodova za koje su Churchillovi analitičari rekli da će Britanija uskoro gladovati.

"Jedina stvar koja me je tokom rata zaista plašila bila je opasnost od podmornice", rekao je kasnije Churchill.

Taman na vrijeme, Turing i njegova grupa uspjeli su probiti podmornice i#x27 komunikaciju sa svojim kontrolorima u Evropi. S podmornicama koje su otkrivale njihove položaje, konvoji bi ih mogli izbjeći u ogromnom atlantskom otpadu.


Revizionistička historija inteligencije u Drugom svjetskom ratu

Police pune istorijskih knjiga napisane su o trijumfima savezničke obavještajne službe u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Ultra Tajna. Čovek koji nikada nije ni bio. Operacija Mljeveno meso. Agente Zigag. Double Cross. Čovek zvan neustrašiv. Pročitao sam sve ovo i još mnogo toga. (Ima ih na stotine.) Sada dolazi britanski novinar i povjesničar Max Hastings s revizionističkim stavom Tajni rat. S pogledom usmjerenim na surovu stvarnost tog sveobuhvatnog sukoba, Hastings razbija mitove koji su inspirirali ove knjige i skida njihova pretjerivanja s klinom sa odavno nedostatkom osjećaja za perspektivu. Efekat je otrežnjujući. Ovo je revizionistička istorija u svom najboljem izdanju. Svako ko želi shvatiti kako se zaista vodio Drugi svjetski rat trebao bi pročitati ovu knjigu bez odlaganja.

Tajni rat: špijuni, šifre i gerile, 1939-1945 autor Max Hastings (2016) 645 stranica ★★★★★

Revizionistička historija: mitovi su razbijeni

Hastings razmatra neke od mnogih izmišljenih izvještaja o britanskoj i američkoj špijunaži u Drugom svjetskom ratu koji su izlazili godinama. Na primjer, on divlja priču o samo-uzdizanju Williama Stevensona u Čovek zvan neustrašiv, nazivajući knjigu “ludo maštovitom. ” Među očitijim lažima u knjizi Stevensona#8217 je i činjenica da se niko osim njega nikada nije nazvao neustrašivim. I, kako Hastings jasno kaže, Stevensonov rad na koordinaciji britanske obavještajne službe u Sjedinjenim Državama nije imao gotovo nikakav utjecaj na rat.

Manje je oštar u svojim kosim upućivanjima na druge knjige, ali jasno stavlja do znanja da mnogi naslovi bestselera preuveličavaju važnost špijuna koje su učinili slavnima. Čak i legendarni Alan Turing dolazi pod mikroskop: Hastings tvrdi da je još jedan mladi matematički genij koji je također radio u Bletchley Parku bio jednako važan u razbijanju Enigma koda. Što je još važnije, sam taj slavni proboj manje je doprinio pobjedi saveznika od ostalih uspjeha u dešifriranju kodova Osovine. (Navodi posebno njemačke i japanske pomorske kodove.) “Bletchley je bio sve važnije oružje, ” Hastings bilješke, “ ali to nije bio magični mač. ”

Signali naspram ljudske inteligencije

Sveobuhvatna tema u Tajni rat je primat inteligencije signala. Hastings tvrdi da su proboji Britanaca, Rusa i Amerikanaca u dešifriranju kodova doprinijeli daleko odlučnijem uspješnom ishodu rata od bilo kakvih špijunskih misija. Osim u Rusiji od 1943. nadalje, napori pokreta otpora u Europi bili su još manje značajni (iako su odigrali veliku ulogu u jačanju narodnog morala). Postoji jedan mogući izuzetak, djelo nevjerovatno šarenih agenata prikazanih u Ben McIntyreu#8217 Dvostruki križ: Istinita priča o špijunima dana D. Ali čak i ovu neospornu priču o uspjehu mora ublažiti spoznaja da je inteligencija signala igrala veliku ulogu u postavljanju i podršci operacije. Sa svih strana, ogroman broj ljudi bio je uključen u slušanje, dekodiranje, tumačenje i izvještavanje o obavještajnim podacima stečenim putem radija.

Međutim, “Jedna od tema u ovoj knjizi je da je signalno -obavještajni rat, zasigurno u svojim ranim fazama, bio manje jednoličan u korist saveznika ’ nego što popularna mitologija sugerira. ”

Koliko je tajna obavještajna služba zapravo doprinijela ishodu rata#8217?

Gledajući širu sliku, Hastings je skeptičan u pogledu efikasnosti bilo koje vrste inteligencije. Kako primjećuje, “Možda je hiljaditi dio od 1 posto materijala prikupljenog iz tajnih izvora od svih zaraćenih strana u Drugom svjetskom ratu doprinio promjeni ishoda ratišta. ” Tokom Tajni rat, on navodi samo četiri strateški značajne bitke u kojima je obavještajna situacija preokrenula situaciju: Sjevernoatlantski rat pod morem, američka pobjeda nad Japancima na Midwayu, neočekivana ruska ofenziva na Kursk i pogrešno usmjeravanje savezničkih desanta u Normandiji, a ne Pas de Calais.

Gledano sa 30.000 stopa i nakon više od sedamdeset godina, nigdje u svijetu nije inteligentno upravljano i pristupalo im se inteligencijom. ” Iako su i Staljin i Hitler bili ozloglašeno prezirući tajne obavještajne podatke, kao što su to činili i japanska vojska, Amerikanci i Britanci takođe nisu uspeli da zaista efikasno iskoriste informacije koje su prikupili njihovi špijuni i razbijači kodova.

Druga otkrića

Možda razumljivo, u pisanju o savezničkim obavještajnim podacima u ratu, američki i britanski autori usredotočili su se na rad MI6, MI5, OSS -a i ogromnog tima akademika u Bletchley Parku. Međutim, Hastings jasno stavlja do znanja da je Sovjetski Savez bio daleko uspješniji u otkrivanju djelotvorne špijunaže od bilo kojeg od svojih glavnih zapadnih saveznika. “Neke ruske prijevare,##piše on, “patuljačke one Britanaca i Amerikanaca. ” Hastings ’ izvještaj o Staljinovim obavještajnim operacijama posebno otkrivaju. Tako je i njegovo skeptično istraživanje i njemačke i japanske tajne obavještajne službe. FBI se također nalazi na udaru kritika: “Sve obavještajne službe nastoje promicati frakcijske interese i napuhavati svoja postignuća, ali ratni FBI je tu praksu doveo do ludosti. . . Nesposobnost FBI -a bila je zapanjujuća. ”

O autoru

Max Hastings je istaknuti britanski novinar, urednik, povjesničar i pisac. Bio je glavni urednik časopisa Dnevni standard i The Daily Telegraph te je na BBC -u predstavio povijesne dokumentarne filmove.

Za dalje čitanje

I ’ve sam također pregledao Operacija Chastise: RAF -ov najsjajniji napad Drugog svjetskog rata by Max Hastings - Komanda bombardera najuspešniji napad na nacističku Nemačku nije bio na njene gradove.

Ako tražite širi pogled na ljudsku povijest, pogledajte Nove perspektive svjetske povijesti.

Na mojoj početnoj stranici uvijek možete pronaći moje najpopularnije recenzije, i najnovije, te vodič kroz cijelu ovu web lokaciju.


Priča o kultnoj Bijeloj kući Prve marinske divizije u Pendletonu

Objavljeno 29. aprila 2020 15:46:53

Zgrada je izdržala test vremena. Vidio je kako generacije marinaca ulaze i izlaze iz svojih dvorana. Doveo je marince u nekoliko ratova sa obala pacifičkih ostrva, planina Severne Koreje, džungli Vijetnama i pustinja Bliskog istoka. Služio je kao operativni i kulturni epicentar 1. divizije marinaca - najcjenjenije i najposljednije divizije u američkom korpusu marinaca. Uvidjela je svoj dio istorije i za diviziju i za Korpus.

Zgrada je čak smatrana i povijesnim lokalitetom, koja i dalje nosi jednostavan stil i bijelu boju povezanu sa zgradama iz doba Drugog svjetskog rata, koje su izvorno trebale biti privremene. Nekoliko vrsta te vrste još uvijek stoji širom nacije, ali ipak ostaje hrabra i u boji i u dizajnu, dok su njeni vršnjaci zamijenjeni desetljećima. Ako prođete po ustajalim dvoranama koje su nekad gazili poput Chestyja Pullera i Jamesa Mattisa, možete vidjeti umjetnička djela - slike prošlih zapovjednika, stare scene bitki istrgnute sa stranica povijesti i fotografije marinaca iz modernih ratova.

“To je#8217 jedinstvena zgrada,#rekao je pukovnik Christopher S. Dowling, bivši načelnik štaba 1. marinske divizije. “Kada je izgrađen 1942-1943, trebao je trajati samo pet godina, pet godina-to je bilo to. ”

Pukovnik američke mornarice Christopher S. Dowling.

(Fotografija američkog korpusa marinaca Lance Cpl. Audrey M. C. Rampton)

Čovečanstvo stvara stvari koje traju alati koji prolaze kroz desetine ruku pre nego što se potroše, strukture koje stoje jake decenijama, vekovima, pa čak i nekoliko milenijuma. Postoje i slučajevi u kojima stvaramo stvari za jednostavnu i laku upotrebu, gdje su namijenjene samo za kratko vrijeme. Jedna od takvih građevina bila je zgrada 1133 kampa Pendleton, poznatija kao "bijela kuća"#8221. Djelujući i kao sjedište i kao zgrada uprave za rastući sukob na Pacifiku, čak se proširio kako bi zadovoljio potrebe 3., 4. i 5. marinske divizije koje su također učestvovale u Pacifičkom pozorištu u Drugom svjetskom ratu.

“Kancelarija narednika#8217 mi je omiljena soba,##rekao je narednik USMC -a Major William T. Sowers, bivši vodnik 1. divizije marinaca. “Količina detalja u drvu i ognjištu daje taj zaista stari osjećaj i daje zraku muzeja. ”

U prvim godinama nije imala nadimak “bijela kuća ”. Stajao je među mnogim zgradama koje su bile obojene u istu jeftinu, golu belu boju i nisu bile jedinstvene izvan svoje namjene. Stiliziran kao mnoge zgrade kako bi osigurao sigurnost komande, služio je mnogim marincima širom Pacifika za vrijeme Drugog svjetskog rata.

Zgrada sjedišta Prve marinske divizije u bazi kampa Marine Pendleton, Kalifornija.

(Fotografija američkog korpusa marinaca, kapetan Joseph Prado)

Struktura je izrasla na temelju marinaca koji su je nazvali domom, a 1946. službeno je zaređena u zgradu Stožera 1. marinske divizije. To bi dovelo do toga da se promijeni desetljećima kasnije, ne jednom, već dvaput kako bi se osiguralo da zgrada može nastaviti funkcionirati i podržavati mnoge marince koji su prolazili kroz njezine hale. Iako je renoviranjem osigurano da je zgrada ostala u skladu s vremenom i tehnologijom tog doba od ožičenja telefona do interneta unutar svojih zidova, njezina ukupna struktura i dizajn i dalje su isti kao i pri prvoj izgradnji.

“To nije bilo toliko ikonično za nas u naše vrijeme, "##8221 rekao je penzionisani general američke mornarice Matthew P. Caulfield. “Nikada to nismo znali kao ‘bijela kuća ’. Nikada nismo razmišljali o činjenici da je to bilo komandno mjesto divizije tokom Drugog svjetskog rata. Jednostavno smo ga poznavali kao mjesto na kojem radimo, iako smo ga ponekad nazivali i ‘ šupa ’. ”

Zbog razdoblja u kojem je nastala ‘bijela kuća ’, bilo je mnogo razvojnih potreba koje su bile potrebne za to vrijeme. Jedna od najvećih bila je potreba da se izdrži mogući napad. Japanska invazija na SAD bila je realna prijetnja 40 -ih. Kako bi se osigurala sigurnost komandnog osoblja, zgrada se nije trebala razlikovati od ostatka. Za one rođene u posljednjih 40 godina, sam koncept vojnog napada na SAD jednostavno je nešto što se ne bi i ne bi moglo dogoditi. Ali 1940. godine, kada je službeno otvoren kamp Pendleton, hiljade marinaca marširalo je iz San Diega na borbene vježbe protiv lažnog neprijatelja. To je izazvalo paniku u civilnom stanovništvu. Ljudi su u početku mislili da se dogodila japanska invazija. Prisustvo baze i#8217 čak je dovelo do pada na tržištu stanova, što je činjenica koja je većini vlasnika kuća u južnoj Kaliforniji danas nezamisliva.

Glavna vrata kampa Pendleton.

Prijetnja napadom s neba utjecala je na veliki dio onoga što će postati Camp Pendleton kakvog danas poznajemo. Kampovi na bazi rašireni su po cijelom kampu na više od 195 kvadratnih milja, prvobitno dizajnirani da zaštite bazu od osakaćenja u jednom odlučujućem zračnom napadu, kaže Dowling. Na tavanima Bijele kuće i drugim zgradama iz tog doba još uvijek postoje dokazi o korištenju originalnog krovišta od šperploče. Prešano drvo tada se koristilo iz dva razloga: stvarne drvene daske imale su hitnu potrebu za izgradnju i zamjenu paluba mornaričkih brodova, a prešano drvo imalo je manje šanse stvarati smrtonosne drvene ostatke ako je zgrade zaglavio japanski bombarder.

“Bela kuća ” dizajnirali su Myron B. Hunt, Harold C. Chambers i E. L. Ellingwood. Njihove firme bavile su se razvojem nekoliko zgrada u Camp Pendletonu tokom 1940 -ih. Zasnovano na kasarni američke mornarice B-1, što je bio uobičajen dizajn koji je dodatno učinio da se zgrada ne razlikuje od drugih zgrada na bazi u to vrijeme, čineći je manje metom za japanske bombardere nakon Pearl Harbora. Nekoliko od ovih baraka je ostalo nakon 70 i više godina od razvoja. B-1, slično kao i njegova bratska struktura, “bijela kuća ” bila je samo privremeni dizajn koji je trebao trajati za vrijeme rata. Kongres 1983. usvojio bi Zakon o odobrenju vojne gradnje iz 1983. koji je srušio mnoge starije privremene građevine Drugog svjetskog rata u korist novih projekata. Neke su građevine obnovljene zbog svog povijesnog značaja. “Bijela kuća ” unutrašnjost je uključena u ove obnove. Vanjski izgled zgrade je promijenjen, ali je zadržao svoj današnji oblik sa samo nekoliko manjih promjena.

Od njene izgradnje mnogi ljudi su ušli u "bijelu kuću"#8221, a mnogi su je prošli pored nje. To je kultni simbol 1. marinske divizije sa desetinama spomenika koji je okružuju, prikazujući žrtvu svakog marinca koji se borio s divizijom u mnogim bitkama kroz našu povijest. Od policajaca koji su 1940. stigli na njegova vrata, do Volkswagenovih Beatlesa 1968., a u novije vrijeme i 2018. imena vaše marke i modela. Kada izađu iz svog vozila, gledali bi u bijelu zgradu obilježenu ikoničnim plavim dijamantom i bojne nizove koje je divizija zaradila.

Zgrada sjedišta Prve pomorske divizije u baznom kampu Marine Corps Pendleton, Kalifornija, 17. maja 2018.

(Fotografija američkog korpusa marinaca, kapetan Joseph Prado)

Nekada je podržavao cijeli zapovjedni sastav, ali sada je veći dio komande raspoređen po kampu Pendleton. Mnogi stipendisti Plavog dijamanta čak su razmišljali o tome da od njega naprave muzej, s obzirom na mnoge povijesne komade koji već okružuju njegove dvorane. Odaje taj osjećaj ulaska u mjesto utkano u historiju.

“ Ikonična zgrada ‘Blue Diamond, ’ to je odjel, ” rekao je Sowers. “Mnogi ljudi pretpostavljaju da je ovo glavno zapovjedno mjesto za Pomorske ekspedicijske snage ili čak za postrojenja Marine Corps West. ”

Mnogi stariji veterani nisu navikli da se bave komandama Prvih pomorskih ekspedicijskih snaga, rekao je Sowers. Kad su pomislili na "bijelu kuću", pomislili su na zapovjednog generala koji je predsjedao svime što su znali o marincima na zapadnoj obali u to vrijeme.

Generali, majori, narednici i kaplari hodali su njegovim dvoranama u posljednjih 70 godina. Neki još uvijek žive među nama, dok su drugi dali najveću žrtvu. Njihova sjećanja i djela žive kroz prvu diviziju marinaca i "bijelu kuću"#8221, koja je bila nepromjenjiv spomenik marincima 1. divizije marinaca. Bez obzira na godine u kojima je neko služio Diviziju, svi su na ovaj ili onaj način poznavali tu zgradu. To je dokaz i divizije i marinaca koji su služili. Naši ideali ukorijenili su se u samu njegovu strukturu i postao je stalni član i u srcima i u mislima marinaca 1. divizije marinaca.

Ovaj članak prvobitno se pojavio u marincima Sjedinjenih Država. Pratite @USMC na Twitteru.


Kursk

Bitka kod Kurska za Nijemce bila je njihova posljednja šansa u konačnom napadu da gurne sovjetsku vojsku do tačke preloma – stoga je zaista bilo 'napravi ili slomi'. Operacija (kodnog naziva 'Citadela') morala je prevladati – ako nije, Nijemci bi nesumnjivo bili potučeni i morali bi se masovno povući. Paralelno s tim, Sovjeti su pokrenuli dvije operacije (Operacija Polkovodets Rumyantsev i Operacija Kutuzov). Bitka je bila jedna od najvećih u Drugom svjetskom ratu, poznata kao velika tenkovska bitka u kojoj je sudjelovalo više od 8.000 tenkova i dva milijuna ljudi. Sovjeti su, međutim, uveliko nadmašili Nijemce.

Nakon mjesec dana i 18 dana nekih od najbrutalnijih i najstrašnijih borbi viđenih u ratu do sada, sovjetske vojske koje su brojčano nadmašile Nijemce - prevladale su, a kako je pobjeda postala konačna, napravljen je presedan za ostatak rata. Sada je bilo evidentno da se sovjetska vojska pokazala superiornom u odnosu na njemačku. Shvaćanje poraza za Nijemce bilo je toliko veliko da su mnogi vidjeli samo poraz za budućnost. Ideološki i fizički njemačka vojska je slomljena.

Prije ove bitke, vjerovatno je rat bio u ravnoteži, s tim da je jedna vojska napadala, a druga kontranapada i tako dalje. Najmanja taktička promjena mogla je izazvati rat za bilo koju stranu. Nakon Kurska, rat je išao samo u jednom smjeru i prema jednom ishodu - sovjetskoj pobjedi.

O autoru

Moje ime je David J. Armstrong (BA Hons) i ja sam britanski vojni istoričar iz Buckinghamshirea. Diplomirao sam War & amp Conflict na univerzitetu 2014. Od tada pišem svoju prvu fantastičnu knjigu o ‘Danu D’ zajedno s drugim kratkim tekstovima koji se nalaze na mom blogu. Ponovno ću pohađati univerzitet 2016. godine i studiranje prema magistarskom studiju vojne istorije sa nadom da ću nastaviti dalje PhD u istoj temi nakon toga.

Volim istraživati, učiti i pisati o istoriji. Moji specijalistički predmeti i moje prave strasti su ratovi 20. stoljeća, uključujući Prvi i Drugi svjetski rat. Možete me pronaći kao dio različitih istorijskih udruženja, poput Udruženja istorijskih pisaca, a možete me pronaći i na twitteru kao @djahistory.

Na mom blogu ćete pronaći zbirku radova - stvari na kojima radim (poput članaka i recenzija, historijskog volonterskog rada i članaka za internetske stranice i časopise), stvari koje sam radio u prošlosti i stvari koje me općenito zanimaju unutar istorije (uključujući istorijske lokacije i muzeje koje posjećujem, knjige koje čitam i članke koji me zanimaju).


Posljedice

Mašina Enigma bila je istovremeno najveća snaga, ali i najveća slabost nacista. Dugo tokom rata uspjeli su potpuno prikriti komunikaciju od saveznika. Međutim, nakon što su saveznici razbili šifru, mašina je postala odgovornost, jer zbog njihove oholosti nacisti se nisu htjeli suočiti s činjenicom da je njihov kôd pogrešan. To se možda može vidjeti iz razmjene između dva njemačka zarobljenika, koju su zabilježili britanski ispitivači:


Radio operater: Često smo razbijali britanski kod, na primjer tokom norveške kampanje, ali oni nikada neće razbiti kod koji smo imali u mornarici. Apsolutno je nemoguće probiti se.

Abwehr commando: Svako to kaže po svom kodu.

Radio operater: Šta! Ne mogu to razbiti.

Abwehr commando: Postoji samo jedna metoda koja se ne može dešifrirati, pa čak i nju mogu dešifrirati stručni matematičari, mislim da mogu razbiti kôd u roku od dvije godine ...

Radio -operater: Ne, ne mogu to riješiti.

Abwehr commando: Oh, to je samo jedna od onih glupih ideja koje ljudi imaju.

Nakon što je kôd probijen, nacisti nisu htjeli vidjeti dokaze o tome kao kršenje koda, već su pretpostavili da su Britanci jednostavno imali izuzetne špijune koji su curili informacije. Stoga su usredsredili svoje napore na pronalaženje ovih špijuna, umjesto da dodatno prilagode svoj kôd (Hofstadter 2).


Zbog velikog broja mogućih kombinacija koda u Enigmi, razbijanje koda zahtijevalo je saradnju između saveznika. Većinu napora uložili su britanski i poljski matematičari u Bletchley Parku u Engleskoj, pod kodnim imenom Project ULTRA. Ovi matematičari su koristili tehnologiju velikih brzina mašina, kao i ručno testiranje, kako bi razbili kod. Do početka 1940 -ih, ti su matematičari već mogli razbiti kôd, međutim, u početku bi bile potrebne sedmice da se razbije jedna poruka, prekasno da bi bile od strateške pomoći. Do 1943. moći će dekodirati poruku za nekoliko minuta i konačno će moći koristiti informacije u njoj. Ovo je u suštini trenutak kada je efikasnost mašine Enigma prestala. I na kraju, insistiranje nacista da nastave koristiti Enigmu možda ih je koštalo rata.


Kao što Ratcliff tvrdi, „Enigma ... pokazuje kako nova tehnologija može brzo preći od zapanjujuće revolucionarne do toliko poznate da njeni operateri padaju u samozadovoljstvo“ (12).


POVEZANI ČLANCI

'Naša je dužnost podsjetiti ljude na ono što su uradili poljski kriptolozi', rekao je za Daily Telegraph.

Vladin zvaničnik rekao je da je u znak priznanja za napore trojice gornji dom poljskog parlamenta donio rezoluciju u njihovu čast za 'obnovu pravde'.

Poljski parlament pokrenuo je kampanju tako da su poljski kriptografi zaslužni za pomaganje u razbijanju nacističkog koda Enigma. Iznad, Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, gdje se kaže da je proboj skratio rat za dvije godine

Rezolucija glasi: 'I u popularnoj literaturi i u službenim informacijama, javnosti je rečeno da je kršenje kodova Enigme posljedica rada britanskih obavještajnih službi do potpunog izostavljanja rada poljskih naučnika.'

Nijemci, koji su tehnologiju koristili od kasnih 1920 -ih, vjerovali su da je šifre nemoguće razbiti.

Koristeći komplikovan sistem rotora, mašina bi kodirala poruke prije nego što ih pošalje putem Morzeove azbuke na drugu mašinu.

Da je prijemna mašina programirana sa istim postavkama - jednom od 158 miliona miliona miliona kombinacija - poruka bi se dešifrirala.

Međutim, tim kriptologa, lingvista, naučnika i analitičara podataka u Bletchleyu u Buckinghamshireu, predvođen Londoner Turingom, uspio ga je razbiti.

Zanemareno: Kate Winslet glumila je u filmu britanske produkcije 2001, Enigma, koji malo spominje doprinos Poljaka

Na svom vrhuncu, tim je svakodnevno razbijao 6.000 šifriranih poruka njemačke Enigme - oslanjajući se na principe koje su postavili Rejewski, Rozycki i Zygalski.

Jan Rulewski, senator iz vladajuće stranke Građanska platforma, rekao je: 'Ova rezolucija vraća pravdu. Ne samo da su zapadni saveznici marginalizirali postignuća poljskih kriptografa, već su i Sovjeti učinili isto.

'Šutjeli su o poljskom doprinosu u spašavanju života stotina hiljada vojnika koji se bore na svim frontovima.'

Film Enigma (snimljen 2001.), s Kate Winslet u glavnoj ulozi i radnja u Bletchleyu, također je uznemirio Poljake - ne samo da umanjuje njihov doprinos, već je i jedini Poljak u filmu izdajica.

Ogorčenje dodaje širem osjećaju u zemlji da je njihov doprinos pobjedi saveznika potcijenjen.

Poljske trupe su se borile u Severnoj Africi, Italiji i Normandiji i učestvovale su u bici za Berlin.

U bici za Britaniju, poljski piloti su imali najveću stopu ubistava.

Ipak, poljskim trupama - koje su i dalje bile pod komandom poljske nezavisne vlade u egzilu - zabranjeno je učešće u zvaničnim proslavama Dana VE zbog britanske želje da umiri Staljina.

Rad na daljinu: Wrens u Bletchley Parku koristili su principe koje su razvili Poljaci kako bi nastavili dešifrirati Enigmu


Seminar Sigurnosne grupe

Ross Anderson: Veliko mi je zadovoljstvo predstaviti današnjeg predavača, ser Harryja Hinsleyja, koji je zapravo radio u Bletchleyu od 1939. do 1946. godine, a zatim se vratio u Cambridge i postao profesor historije međunarodnih odnosa i magistar Sveučilišta St. John. On je i službeni povjesničar britanske obavještajne službe u Drugom svjetskom ratu, a danas će s nama razgovarati o Ultri.

Sir Harry: Kao što ste čuli, od mene su tražili da govorim o Ultra -u i reći ću nešto o obje strane, naime o kriptoanalizi, a zatim s druge strane o upotrebi proizvoda - naravno da je Ultra ime dobio proizvod.

Stoga bih trebao početi tako što ću vas upozoriti da ja nisam matematički ili tehnički stručnjak. Imao sam privilegiju biti pomoćnik matematičara predvođenih Maksom Newmanom i Alanom Turingom, ali nikada nisam naučio savladati ili čak pristupiti savladavanju njihove umjetnosti.

Ultra je, naravno, bio proizvod šifri. Koristilo se samo za proizvod mjerenja važnijih šifri, a od proljeća 1941. u Bletchleyu razbili smo većinu šifri do neviđene mjere i s neviđenim nedostatkom kašnjenja. I dva su razloga bila za taj uspjeh.

Prije svega, samo među vladama tih godina, britanska vlada je već 1920 -ih koncentrirala sve svoje kriptoanalitičke napore na jednom mjestu koje je nazvala Vladin kodeks i škola šifriranja. Drugo, u Bletchleyu se broj osoblja povećao sa oko 120 u 1939. na oko 7000 početkom 1944.

Naravno, to osoblje nije bilo potpuno kriptoanalitičko, već se sastojalo i od ogromnog broja osoblja koje se koristilo, na primjer, za signaliziranje proizvoda komandama u ostatku Engleske ili u inozemstvu. And so it wasn't entirely cryptanalytical staff - it was a very mixed staff compared with pre-war.

In addition, those men and women, recruited mainly from universities, developed methods and machinery of a sophistication hitherto undreamt of, including as you all know the first operational electronic computer which was called Colossus.

Without those advances, at least the most difficult of the ciphers, which were (although I will make some qualifying remark about this in a minute) those based on the German Enigma and those still more complex systems which Germany introduced for ciphering non-morse transmissions, would have been for all practical purposes invulnerable.

Now the value of the resulting Ultra was all the greater because the enemy states - Germany, Italy and Japan - remained unaware of the British successes.

The main reason for that was that they didn't allow for that sophistication of method and machinery which the British brought to the attack on their ciphers. They didn't allow for that when they constructed their ciphers.

Nothing very surprising in that. As I have said, the methods and machinery developed were of a sophistication hitherto unthought of.

But it still remains necessary to say that, despite that sophistication, the German belief that the ciphers would remain invulnerable was almost right, almost correct.

The ciphers nearly escaped effective exploitation.

In the case of the Enigma (which was an electro-mechanical machine) the first solutions were made by hand by mathematicians relying on German operators' errors. The German airforce was always more untidy in its signalling than the other users of the Enigma.

And for that purpose (although you will understand it better than I do) they used perforated sheets and exploited these mistakes made by German operators.

For other keys than the airforce, especially those of the army and the navy, and especially for the regular and speedy solution of those keys, it was necessary to develop an effective answering cryptanalytical machine.

That was the key in the end to the prompt decrypting of the machine cyphers.

It was a machine called The Bombe - a name originally given to it by the Poles who invented an early prototype in the 1930's. The Bombe developed in Bletchley by Turing and Welshman and Babbage - all luminaries of the Cambridge scene - was helped a little by the Polish machine, but it was infinitely more powerful, about fifteen times more powerful than the Polish machine. And it was because of the greater difficulties of dealing with the Enigma that it had to be that powerful.

But it wasn't enough to have that machinery developed. Except in the case of the airforce keys, we had to capture them before the machinery - even this Bombe machinery - could break into them.

And that is where people like myself who were non-mathematical came into the story. It was because I was in close touch with Turing, for example, that I was fully aware of what he had to have before the machine which he had developed could exercise its powers.

And I was able to arrange - with other people of course, including the navy - how to capture that. I stress that because, both in the case of the navy and of the army, and at dates which are later than we realise (I will give you the dates later), we needed in addition to this superb mathematics, which was assisted of course by superb Post Office engineering, we needed also these side assets - essentially captured material.

That was the Enigma. Now with the non-morse machine which we called Fish, the first successes were again obtained by hand methods. And those hand methods by mathematicians again exploited German operators' errors. In fact, the actual understanding of the machine theoretically (in other words as opposed to breaking it every day), the actual understanding of how it worked was obtained because the Germans went through a long series of experiments with it on the air before they brought it into operational use.

And it was these experimental transmissions which primarily were the errors which gave the entree.

But it was obvious that any regular or at all reasonably speedy decryption would be impossible if again machine methods were not developed. In particular that they would be impossible without machines because the different Fish ciphers proliferated, just like the different Enigma keys proliferated, and you were dealing with a lot of ciphers concurrently.

And so in this case, as you know, the machine was developed which came to be called Colossus.

It was of course a much more complex - it wasn't a mere electronic electro-mechanical thing - it was the first computer. It had to be like that in proportion to the fact that the Fish was far more complex than the Enigma.

Now it will be clear from what I have said that the problem wasn't merely to master the machines. The Germans recognised when they were constructing (in their view) an invulnerable set of machines, that of course in wartime they would be open to capture and therefore locally and temporarily they will be read.

But they also felt that the mere local (by which I mean reading one key instead of another key) and temporary reading (in other words that would complete your fundamental knowledge of the machine) wouldn't help you to read it regularly and daily. And they were right, without this machinery that would have been impossible.

And in particular it would be impossible because each of the Enigma and the Fish were used by the Germans as the basis not merely for one cipher each, not merely one Enigma and one Fish, but as the basis for a wide range of different ciphers, each cipher having its different key.

At one time the Germans were operating concurrently about fifty Enigmas, some in the army, some in the airforce, some in the navy, some in the railways, some in the secret service. And so you were faced not merely with understanding the machine and with breaking a key regularly, but with breaking fifty sometimes regularly at once, or as many of them as you could without delay.

And Fish similarly rose from just one link, one cipher, one key to about 22 cipher links, all quite separate except they were using the same machine. And remember that each of them - the Enigma daily and the Fish at varying interludes, usually every few days - changed the keys.

So you are on constant alert - every day you had to start again at midnight, and you had to start on perhaps 30 Enigmas or 5 Fishes and so you could see the mere load put it beyond any manual solution.

That was one reason, that in spite of their confidence which was not far from being fully justified, that was one reason why the German confidence was proved to be unfounded. The other was (perhaps it is no less important) the fact that steps were taken to avoid arousing enemy suspicion.

The British imposed strict secrecy of course on the Ultra production process. Strict regulations about its distribution - who should be indoctrinated - strict regulations against carelessness by users when using it.

Those regulations were pretty effective. There were from time to time cases in the war where the Germans did sufficiently suspect to have an enquiry. There were cases when the Italians suspected and advised the Germans to have an enquiry.

I ought to say that everything I have been saying about the complex nature of the attack on the ciphers hardly applied to the Italian ciphers - and this is where I am going to bring my ironical remark in about ciphers which will interest you people as machinery experts.

The Italians only ran one machine and it was a baby really compared with the Enigma. It was a machine built by a firm called Hagelin (we called it C-38). The American armed forces used it occasionally, but it was easily broken. We broke it. It didn't come into use until the beginning of '41 and we broke it by June '41.

It was a very valuable cipher for shipping in relation to North African operations but it wasn't a cryptanalytical problem of the kind I have been describing in the case of the German ciphers.

Ironically the Italians, except for that one cipher and also for one they used for their diplomats, didn't use machines. They used book ciphers, and ironically we couldn't read the Italian book ciphers for the army, the navy and the airforce after they brought new ones in between June and November 1940 preparatory to or as a consequence of their own entry into the war.

Book ciphers proved to be invulnerable when the machinery proved not to be invulnerable!

And as I say the Italians occasionally, who rather looked down on machine ciphers, warned the Germans that they thought that there was evidence that the way the allies behaved suggested that maybe they were reading the German ciphers. And the Germans said 'Pooh, pooh, we are alright!' Apart from occasional suspicions, those precautions I described, as used by the Allies, worked.

They were wholly justifiable ones. Any confirmation reaching the Germans that this whiff of suspicion that this system that they had constructed wasn't safe, would have led to not easy but not impossible steps to render it safe.

But of course the precautions complicated the task of establishing the value that Ultra had in the war.

Contemporary reports and the memoirs and histories that have been published before the records about Ultra became available, of course allow for, incorporate, the contribution Ultra made to decisions and the course of events, but they don't acknowledge it. Because either the writers of the reports and the memoirs didn't know about it, or they were not able to mention it.

So that historians now have to identify that contribution from the written records about the war and it is a straightforward job to do that now that Ultra is available. You can see - we know what Ultra went to what commands, we know what time it arrived, we know what other intelligence they had at the time the Ultra arrived, we know what decisions and orders followed from its arrival, and frequently we have discussions on record about what they thought about what they ought to do about it before they reached their decisions.

It is not enough to establish accurately the availability of the Ultra and to reach reasonable conclusions about its influence on British and American assessments and decisions. You have also got to consider the consequences of those assessments and decisions on the war.

Let me give an example of the distinction. Once you have identified the Ultra (which you now can from the decrypts in the Public Record Office) you can see pretty clearly (if you have also got the record of the war) that Ultra was the main reason why the British were able to reduce the depredations of the U- Boats in the Atlantic in the second half of 1941.

But what was the value of that effect in the North Atlantic in that second half of 1941 on the course of the war? What was the consequence of that use of Ultra on the course of the war? And those effects too are already incorporated into the record, which shows that the U-Boats were defeated in the North Atlantic in the second half of 1941.

Of course in order to assess the true significance of Ultra we have got to assume that it didn't exist in the North Atlantic at that time. We have got to strip it out of the record in order to get its true significance into focus.

This is what historians call counter-factual history. To calculate something assuming that some factors in it didn't exist. And I am sure it is a process well known to mathematicians and other people like yourselves.

But it is still the case that there is a great deal of danger in using counter-factual history unless you use it very carefully. For example it is very common among historians to use counter-factual history either from a desire to shock or because the user in question hasn't got any judgement. And you have therefore got to use it in relation to the possibilities that were practically available in the circumstances that you are considering.

There is no danger whatever in reconstructing the course of the war on the assumption that Ultra hadn't existed.

As I have said the story of its acquisition is of near legendary, even science fiction proportions, because it might so easily not have taken place. You are not making a huge assumption when you start playing with the record of the war on the basis that it hadn't been solved, it hadn't been obtained.

It was by no means fortuitous or miraculous. It was the consequence of forces deliberately brought together to solve it. But it was far from being inevitable that the forces would succeed. The proposition that we might have had to fight the war without Ultra is a reasonable and necessary element in the assessment of its true significance.

On the other hand if you apply counter-factual history and use this proposition that Ultra might not have existed, you are undertaking a pretty bold enterprise in hypothesis and speculation and you must control that exercise by a constant reference to the straightforward facts about what Ultra actually did do.

If you apply that check, then I think we can draw two pretty sound conclusions. First of all, though we did obtain it in such amounts, amounts rising to 2,000 of those Italian Hagelin decrypts a day at the peak of the Mediterranean War and to 30,000 a month rising to 90,000 a month of Enigma and Fish decrypts combined - that is a very big number of decrypts. It is still the case that those volumes and the speed with which they were got out were not fully established until the second half of 1941.

Up 'till June '41 the successes were confined to decrypts of the German airforce Enigma and some of the Italian book ciphers which were quite readable before Italy came into the war and for a month or two afterwards.

Those helped to produce isolated allied successes like the Battle of Matapan when we defeated the Italian fleet, and wouldn't have done so but for a few Enigma and Italian signals which gave enough warning to the British Alexandria fleet.

The distances in the Mediterranean are such that unless you have got some notice you can't cover the thousand miles or the seven hundred and fifty miles.

So Matapan was one success. The sinking of the Bismark was another. Again I am speaking of the period before June '41. She was sunk in May '41 just before the turn. The defeat of the Italians in East Africa and in North Africa. Those were Allied successes, but they were slightly isolated successes.

Again in the same period Ultra did something to mitigate British disasters. It greatly assisted the British forces that were sent to Greece, to retreat without serious loss when it become obvious that they couldn't hold a line against the scale of the German invasion.

It gave us - here was another disaster - all the information required to destroy the German attack on Crete. We didn't destroy the attack but we made it an extremely damaging exercise for the Germans, which was done because the Ultra signals were so complete.

Some people think we should have prevented or destroyed the invasion - an air landing invasion. In fact Bletchley Park felt very strongly for the first time in the war that its product had not been used properly in the case of the Crete invasion. I think possibly that we were wrong now that we can see the evidence in more detail, but at least it helped to make it a disastrous operation for the Germans even though they actually got Crete as a consequence.

And so in all that story you can see that the British survived the war with little benefit from Intelligence until the Germans invaded Soviet Russia. And since Soviet Russia survived the German invasion, and that invasion was followed by the entry of the United States in December '41, we can safely conclude that Germany was going to be defeated in the long run, even if the enormous expansion of Ultra from the summer of 1941 had not from that date given the Allies this massive superiority in Intelligence which they retained until the end of the war.

They were hardly ever rivalled by Axis success in reading our ciphers. There were two major exceptions to the lack of success by the Axis against Allied ciphers. One was that they did have some success in reading a British naval cipher which was for a longish time also shared with the American navy in relation to convoy escorting.

They were successful in reading that for a long period from 1940 to the end of '42. And the other was that they didn't exactly capture but they managed to extract of copy of the cipher that was being used by the American Military Attache in Cairo for a period when Rommel was at his most dangerous. And from that too the Germans obtained some great advantage.

But generally speaking, except possibly in relation to the convoy cipher, there was never any great cryptanalytical rivalry. The Germans were completely outclassed in terms of Ultra. The Italians also made very little progress against any important allied cipher.

In June 1941 however, (we survived 'till then with very little value from the Ultra), the end of the war still four years away. And that is such a length of time that we might be tempted to jump to the other conclusion and say that far from producing by itself on its own the defeat of the Axis, it made only a marginal contribution to it.

Here we are, we start getting this Ultra coming onto stream in June '41 as opposed to the slight trickle before that date, and yet you have still got four years of war. How can it have made much difference?

But that second conclusion can I think be as firmly dismissed as the one I have been discussing about how Ultra didn't really win the war.

The second real conclusion that stands out is that Ultra was decisive in shortening the war from the time, beginning in the summer of 1941, the cryptanalytical successes were extended from the German airforce Enigma keys to the Enigmas used by the navy and the army and the secret service, to the non-morse ciphers of the German High Command which came on stream in mid 1941, and to a new Italian machine cipher, the one I have mentioned which also was brought into force beginning of '41 and broken in the summer of '41. And to the ciphers of the Italian and German and especially Japanese Embassies.

The Japanese Embassies in Europe were in the second half of the war to prove of immense Intelligence value because they were repeating back to Tokyo their versions of German assessments and their knowledge of German intentions. They were almost as valuable on some subjects (like for example the Normandy Landings) as were the direct Ultra from the German horse's mouth.

From the moment we began that expansion you can see that the influence is continuous. I have spoken of the amount of Ultra there was. The lack of delay, the fact that they were obtained with very little delay was equally important. After all, one of the crucial characteristics of Intelligence is that to be useful it must be quick.

In the case of the Enigmas we didn't exactly reach a position in which the new keys, having come into force at midnight, were broken by breakfast, but of, shall we say, twenty, twenty five Enigmas running concurrently (the number varied according to different stages of the war), we would be reading twenty to twenty five at most times. Of that twenty to twenty five the ones to which highest priority was given on the limited number of Bombes available would be out by breakfast. Which meant that the whole of the rest of that 24 hours' signals from the moment you broke the key for the day, the setting for the day, would be read instantaneously, as soon as the message was intercepted it would be decrypted.

Fish was a bit slower. It didn't change daily like the Enigma. It varied, on different links it changed with different frequency. The average was that it changed about once every five or six days - the setting of the keys changed every five or six days.

Again the number we read varied from time to time but from the end of '42 when Fish on the German side got going strongly, we were generally reading four or five Fish links at any one time.

Generally we were reading them about seven, six, five days late - after their transmission. That didn't matter with Fish (at least it didn't matter so much as it would have done with Enigma) because, whereas the Enigma like that Italian machine was used for what you might call operational purposes below army level for something that was happening tomorrow or happening today, Fish was reserved for communications between the highest commands of the German Armed Forces. Between Berlin and the army groups or the armies. And then never lower than armies. It was a system that increasingly replaced the landline transmissions between Berlin and Kesselring in Rome and Von Rundstedt who was commander in the west in Paris by 1943.

They were on landlines normally but gradually with Fish being perfected as they thought and with landlines being damaged by bombing they put more onto the air.

So Fish was carrying Intelligence of a character that didn't really depend for its value on immediacy. It would carry long term estimates, or it would carry prolonged discussions between German Headquarters on the Russian Front or in Italy and Berlin about what was the best thing to do next. So you didn't have the immediacy requirement there as you did with the Enigma.

Speaking on the whole then we can see the fact that we were getting Ultra in the amounts I spoke of and with the speed that I emphasised as being a very important characteristic of valuable Intelligence. It was no use having Enigma a week late, and it wouldn't be much use having Fish more than a month late.

If you had that amount of decrypts with that small amount of delay, it would, I think, on the face of it, be surprising if Ultra hadn't contributed to the very considerable shortening of the war, given the fact that on the other side the enemy is blind and his Intelligence is increasingly deteriorating because of the Allied possession of the superiority in Intelligence.

I will give you an example of that. We read all the Enigma signals of the German Abwehr which meant that we captured every spy that arrived in the United Kingdom by having advance knowledge of his arrival. Which meant that we could turn such as we needed and use them to send messages we wanted the Abwehr to receive, and monitor the reception and the reaction of the Abwehr. All that signal Intelligence underlay the effective use of what was called the Doublecross Operation for the purposes both of stopping German reception of Intelligence (other than false Intelligence) and also of creating deception by sending them false Intelligence.

So given that they were so blind and we were getting this increasing amount with less and less delay, it would be surprising if it hadn't, from the middle of '41, contributed pretty appreciably to the difficulties of the enemy and to the accurate appreciations of the Allies.

Now the question remains how much did it shorten the war, leaving aside the contribution made to the campaigns in the Far East on which the necessary work hasn't been done yet. My own conclusion is that it shortened the war by not less that two years and probably by four years - that is the war in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Europe.

The detailed answer for those theatres begins in the Mediterranean. There, in the autumn of 1941 against Rommel it turned almost certain defeat into a stalemate. If not then, then certainly in the summer of 1941 after Rommel had returned to the Egyptian frontier, it made a decisive contribution to keeping him out of Egypt between his victory at the Battle of Gazala in 1942 and the British getting ready for their own victory at El Alamein.

It did this chiefly by killing off his seaborne supplies. Both the Italian machine cipher and the airforce Enigma and a bit of naval Enigma contributed decisively to starving Rommel of fuel and replacement hardware and ammunition.

Without that, the commander of our own forces at the time, General Auchinleck, concluded that Rommel would have got through to Egypt.

As you know at that time the Allies themselves were landing in North West Africa. If they had lost Egypt they might have abandoned the operation against North West Africa, especially as they would also have lost Malta if Egypt went, and decided to alter their strategy (we have to allow for this possibility) and go back and concentrate on the North Sea and the direct Second Front.

Now if they had stayed in the Mediterranean it would have taken them a least a year longer than it actually took them from Tunis and from the Western Desert to complete the conquest of North Africa and open the Mediterranean. That was successfully achieved in May '43.

It wouldn't have been achieved in less than a year beyond that, if we had gone on in spite of the loss of Egypt trying to do it. It wouldn't have been achieved in time to do the Normandy landings in 1944.

If they had abandoned the idea of re-conquering North Africa, the most probable course would have been in fact what the Americans had always wanted to do, to do the cross Channel invasion more quickly than in fact occurred. It in fact occurred in June '44. They would have turned back and done that straight away, that was their obvious alternative.

What would have been the prospect for that undertaking if Ultra hadn't become available against the U-Boats in June 1941 and radically reduced their successes against the convoys.

We know that in that second half of 1941 their shipping successes were cut back to 120,000 tons a month average. That has to be compared not with the monthly average of 280,000 tons a months in the four months before June '41 but with the sinkings they would have achieved with their greater number of U-Boats.

It has been calculated that the Ultra saved about one and half million tons in September, October, November and December '41.

And even if Britain's essential imports had not without that reduction been reduced to a dangerously low level, the intermission that provided was invaluable in enabling the British to build up reserves in merchant shipping and develop anti-submarine defences.

So that when the U-Boats returned to the Atlantic after their first defeat (they did that in the autumn of 1942), they had been delayed in making a decisive thrust for more than a year. Now when they returned they had been supplied with an advanced Enigma, one that instead of using three wheels concurrently used four wheels, which as you can see noticeably increased the mathematical difficulties of solving the key.

In fact Bletchley couldn't solve it from February to December 1942. Mercifully for us (though not for the Americans) most of the U-Boats were on the Atlantic American coast at that time, but as they came back to the North Atlantic convoys they were still using this cipher and they brought about another crisis in the Atlantic.

It again was the Ultra which brought them under control. The figures of sinkings of Allied shipping reached the highest in the war in March '43. They had been brought down by May '43 to lower proportions than ever before in the war as a result of this return of Ultra to the scene.

And so you can see that the problem of undertaking the Normandy landings if those two defeats and controls of the U-Boats hadn't occurred would have been very pronounced.

Then there was the contribution of Enigma to the Normandy Landings themselves (I can't go into detail and will answer questions if you need). I think it is no exaggeration to say that even if the U-Boats had prevented it from being attempted only until '45, we would have found it an infinitely more difficult operation to do than in 1944. The Germans would have completed the Atlantic defences, they would be bombarding Britain with 'V' weapons on a massive scale, all of which was in the event cut off by the '44 Landings. And they would have had a much bigger Panzer Army to deal with the problems.

My own calculation is we wouldn't in fact have been able to do the Normandy Landings, even if we had left the Mediterranean aside, until at the earliest 1946, probably a bit later. It would have then taken much longer to break through in France and Germany than it did in fact take, which was a year from '44. And altogether therefore the war would have been something like two years longer, perhaps three years longer, possibly four years longer than it was.

I am sorry I have exceeded my length of time but I hope you will forgive me, and I will do what I can to answer questions.

P. Would we have won the war without Ultra?

My own view is that given that the Soviets survived the German attack and the Americans came in as they did, the combined forces of Russia, America and the British would eventually have won the war. The long term relative strengths of Germany and those three counties were such that Germany was bound to loose in the end. But how lengthily and with what damage and destruction we should have succeeded I don't know. I think we would have won but it would have been a long and much more brutal and destructive war.

P. Was Bletchley involved at all in cryptanalysis of the Russian theatre?

We read a large amount of German signals from the Russian front, but no work was done against Soviet signals after Germany invaded Russia, on account of the high priority given to Axis signals. On the other hand, co-operation with the Soviets was never as close as it was with the USA.

Of course when the Americans came into the war in December '41 we had already begun some development of a cryptanalytical partnership with them, and when they came into the war that partnership became almost so complete as to constitute a single joint cryptanalytical effort. Of course that effort involved division of labour and the division of labour is much directed by the interception facilities. For example, except for the Atlantic traffic the American coast couldn't intercept European, German and Italian signals. That was all being intercepted in the UK. Obvious solution - UK concentrates on decrypting, on cryptanalysis against German and Italian. America which can intercept the Pacific from the Pacific and also has headquarters in Brisbane and various places in the Pacific - America concentrates of working on the Japanese.

But there are overlaps. For example we have a cryptanalytical annexe at Bletchley, we have it in Singapore, it moved to Hong Kong, it moved to Ceylon, and from there it pitches in its bit by serving the decrypts direct to the American Headquarters. Similarly because the U-Boat traffic can be heard both in America and in Britain, the two sides - Bletchley and the American Navy - swopped keys. They have got a direct line. They say 'we will take 4th June, you take tomorrow 5th June,' and so they split the keys and swopped solutions. So there was an almost total amalgamation of resources and a logical division of labour.

P. Is it not the case that the arrival of the atom bomb in 1945 would have bought a quicker solution?

This is a problem because strict, sensible, proper counter-factual history can't really take into account something like that. It is speculation. But of course if my scenario is right and the war was still struggling on and we had the bomb which presumably we would still have had, the problem of whether to drop it on Germany would have arisen. And in some respects the dropping of it on Germany would be more justified than the dropping of it on Japan because Japan was visibly on her knees when we dropped it on her, but in my scenario Germany would have been far from on her knees. So yes the prospects of it being dropped as the solution are quite high. I would mention it in a speculative scenario.

P. How closely did Bletchley work with the Russians on decryption?

It couldn't be as close as the collaboration I have described with the Americans for a variety of reasons. One is of course that there just hadn't been the close relationship between the two countries that existed historically between the British and the Americans. The other was that when we actually broke the ciphers - Enigma in the first instance, but Fish later - that were relevant to the Eastern Front, they were coming in to us at a time when it was uncertain whether Russia would survive. And then later on when Russia had survived and we were reading more ciphers both Fish and Enigma from the Eastern Front, there was the problem that we knew from the Enigma that the Germans were reading Russian ciphers, so that if they had too much Enigma intelligence in their ciphers you see the security risk was extremely high. Then fourthly the Russians were not collaborative. They wanted any intelligence we supplied but they wouldn't give any in return. Not that they had much Sigint, but they had a lot of other Intelligence.

The answer to your question is with all those difficulties we couldn't have so close a collaboration with the Russians as we had with Washington, but we started sending them a summary of signal intelligence a week after they were attacked by the Germans in '41. We sent it via the British Military Mission in Moscow where there were people to hand it over to the Russian General Staff.

We had to have a cover for it, had to explain to them that this is the horse's mouth but it is coming to us (this is the kind of cover we used) it is coming to us from very high ranking German officers who are slipping the news to us through Berne or somewhere like that, and we are getting it quickly because we have got pretty direct connections with Switzerland.

A steady stream of information about German intentions and dispositions - Airforce and Army on the Eastern Front - were sent to them. They were interrupted from time to time when the Russians were being particularly beastly. For example at the top of Russia, Murmansk at the Kola Inlet where all the convoys taking arms to Russia and supplies were going, we had to keep seamen, sailors, both to man the Allied facilities, unloading facilities - of course the Russians were there too but we had to keep some British sailors there. And then we persuaded the Russians to let us have an Intercept station there because half of the traffic around the top of the North Cape was difficult to intercept even in Northern Scotland.

And of course we covered the risk that they would suspect that we were reading Enigma or that they would do more than suspect that, by saying that the value of the traffic to us was that it enabled us, by traffic analysis, to judge the German reactions to the movements of the convoys. So we had this little intercept station and then the Russians locked them all up because they thought we were spying on them, so you had all sorts of little rows with them like that. From time to time when it wasn't vital we did say if you don't behave better than this we wont send you your daily summary. And we stopped it for a short time, then we started again. But it had to be of that character - the collaboration.

P. Is there scope for counter-factual historians studying the siege of Leningrad - if they had had access to the Ultra information that you could have given them.

Again you have to bear in mind that there were problems. For example, one of the areas in which we found it extremely difficult to intercept German signals because of radio conditions or atmosphere conditions or whatever it is, was the North Cape and the other was the Leningrad area. It was very difficult to intercept from the Leningrad area because whatever frequency they were using relative to the distances and the ionosphere we never could cover the Leningrad area properly. Caucaucus on the other hand, Central Front, we could hear then as clear as a bell.

P. If the collaboration had been as close as with the Americans . . .

It would have been an advantage if it had been as close as with the Americans, it is quite true. But on the other hand the risks which I briefly portrayed were quite considerable. And we did our best to make sure that they knew about all the important forthcoming development. Don't forget they had very good intelligence of their own, not primarily Sigint but they had very good air reconnaissance and air superiority after a certain time, and they had an enormous espionage system behind the German lines. So they weren't without information. But we did do our best to make sure that they got crucial early notice whenever we got it ourselves.

It was a big dilemma and one that was fought about. Churchill wanted to risk it and let them have more. Naturally the Ultra authorities didn't want to risk it because everything hangs on it you see, so there was a tussle all the time about how much to send.

P. The was a programme recently on Kursk - one might say that a Russian counter-factual historian would say that if we didn't have the Ultra which we got in various ways, then we wouldn't have been able to win the battle of Kursk and Hitler would have been able to carve up Russia. This is perhaps another case . . .

Another case. Stalingrad of course is another one. Those two battles were crucial, especially Stalingrad. Again it wasn't only through us they were getting . . . we did give them the central facts in advance of Kursk. But as we now know, we didn't know at the time, the one single Russian agent in Bletchley was at that time (just that short period of time before and after Kursk in '43) actually giving them decrypts through the Russian Embassy in London. So all sorts of complications about the story. He didn't know that they were getting the supply from London officially, and we didn't know that he was sending the decrypts unofficially. Quite a complex problem!

P. Did they never figure out that this was coming from decrypts?

We are never quite clear. Certainly when this man at Bletchley who only surfaced after the war - the secret about him only surfaced after the war - they knew that what they were getting from him was decrypts. They must then have known that our summaries were decrypts. But that didn't alter our practice because we didn't know that he was sending them the decrypts.

P. How was the Ultra Information disguised so that the Germans couldn't work out that you were decrypting them?

How did we disguise what we had got you mean?

P. How did you disguise, for example, that a particular submarine was going through a particular area? How could you disguise it so that it wasn't obvious that you'd intercepted it?

Let me give you an example of how we took the precautions, using it without on the other hand giving grounds for suspicion to the other side. The most dramatic example comes from the Mediterranean where we sank at two or three stages in the war something from 40% to 60% of every ship that left the north shore of the Mediterranean for North Africa. 60% of the shipping was sunk, for example, just before the Battle of Alamein and again just before Gazala when Rommel was stopped.

Every one of those ships before it was attacked and sunk had to be sighted by a British aeroplane or submarine which had been put in a position in which it would sight it without it knowing that it had been put in that position, and had made a sighting signal which the Germans and the Italians had intercepted. That was the standard procedure. As a consequence of that the Germans and the Italians assumed that we had 400 submarines whereas we had 25. And they assumed that we had a huge reconnaissance airforce on Malta, whereas we had three aeroplanes!

But solemnly that procedure had to be followed by the commanders. When they in their little centre in Cairo or, as it was later on Algiers, said we can't sink all those seventeen ships today, which five are we going to take first and which five will we take second, when they were doing this they had to arrange that procedure before they hit a single ship.

Similar precautions were taken in the Atlantic, but there the problem was different. That is why the Germans got most suspicious about the Atlantic. The great feature there was that the Enigma was used in the first instance not to fight the U- Boats but to evade them. And the problem was how could you evade them without their noticing. You have a situation on the graph in which the number of U-Boats at sea in the Atlantic is going up, and the number of convoys they see is going down!

How do you cover that? We did cover it but it was done by a different system from what I have just described in the Mediterranean. We let captured Germans, people we had captured from U-Boats write home from prison camp and we instructed our people when interrogated by Germans - our pilots for example - to propagate the view that we had absolutely miraculous radar which could detect a U-Boat even if it was submerged from hundreds of miles. And the Germans believed it.

They had an enquiry saying 'surely it must be possible that it is the Enigma that isn't safe.' And the cipher men come back and say 'it can't be the Enigma.' So somebody gets up and says 'well, it must be this bloody radar that we have heard about.' And so they decided. But you see different solutions had to be adopted for each particular situation. But these were the kind of precautions that were taken I think with great success. I mean they never really did tumble to the idea that it was unsafe, which is pretty marvellous really.

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Sunday, February 16, 2014

A Failure of Coalition Leadership: The Falaise-Argentan Gap

This report describes the roles, missions, and command relationships of four significant personalities (Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery and Lieutenant Generals Bradley and Patton) of the Allied military coalition prior to and during the Allied breakout from the Normandy peninsula. Specific personalities and personal characteristics that affected coalition relationships are described. The report discusses the strategic and operational advantages of both sides as of August 1, 1944 and gives a brief overview of the actual battle. Specific leadership failures and analysis of those failures and the strategic consequences are described in detail.

The Influence of Ultra on World War II

In the last half decade, intelligence, once a stepchild in World War II history, has assured itself a place among more fully covered aspects of the conflict. A flood of new information and insights was set off by revelations on the ULTRA secret initiated by Gustave Bertrand and F. W. Winterbotham.' The cloud of mystery once dispelled, the door was open to further disclosures on ULTRA itself and the unique role claimed for it in influencing the course of the war and, conceivably, its final outcome. With so much brought to the light of day, the remaining aspects of the clandestine sides of the conflict scarcely seemed worth the trouble of keeping them in obscurity. British Secret Service files, which remained closed in the late 60's when the reduction of the traditional waiting period on the release of public records to 30 years offered so many windfalls to World War II scholars, have become increasingly accessible.

This essay will assume a broad familiarity with the epic tale of how Polish, French, and British scientists and cryptologists unraveled the mysteries of the German Enigma machine and, eventually, of most of the codes in which its messages were transmitted. A similar acquaintance is assumed for how ULTRA came to be the central element in first British and then Anglo-American intelligence gathering and appraisal and for innumerable operational decisions. What will be attempted here is a rather far-reaching and risk-taking assessment of the part ULTRA played in the war's Western theaters. Factors which underlined or detracted from its impact on events, estimates of its influence on strategy, and evaluation of its contribution to the outcome of the war will be reviewed.

Aside from blanket claims which usually had little dialectical or evidential underpinning, this goes somewhat beyond what has been essayed in previous studies and may appear to some, at this stage of investigation and analysis, as a daring undertaking. Justification for such a course lies in the plea that debate on this complex of problems will be advanced constructively by sharpening the focus on fundamental and longer-range issues as well as offering targets for critical discussion.

The more attention is demanded by problems derived from disclosures about ULTRA, the greater must be awareness of their complexity, especially in any effort to reach clear-cut answers. Having to start somewhere, the tendency has been to simplify by concentrating on ULTRA's place in welldefined phases or during closely associated operations in order to stake out the part it may be presumed to have played.


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